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I. INTRODUCTION 
Snyder v. Phelps1 addresses the limits of the First Amendment in 
protecting expressive conduct from tort claims.2 On March 10, 2006, 
the Westboro Baptist Church picketed the funeral of Lance Corporal 
Matthew Snyder (Lance Cpl. Snyder) who was killed while on 
military duty in Iraq.3 Albert Snyder (Snyder), Matthew’s father, 
subsequently sued the Westboro Baptist Church, the Reverend Fred 
Phelps, and two of Phelps’s daughters (collectively the WBC), alleging 
a number of tort claims arising from the incident.4 A jury awarded 
Snyder $10.9 million in damages for “intentional infliction of mental 
and emotional distress, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon 
seclusion, and conspiracy to commit these acts.”5 The WBC renewed 
an earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, claiming its speech was “purely religious 
in nature” and that the verdict “unconstitutionally restricted the 
content of [the speech in question].”6 The district court denied these 
motions, focusing on Snyder’s status as a private (i.e., not a public) 
figure.7 The WBC appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding 
that “[b]ecause the judgment attaches tort liability to constitutionally 
protected speech, the district court erred in declining to award 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law 
 1. Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. argued Oct. 6, 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–72 (D. Md. 2008). 
 4. Id. at 572. The claims alleged are “defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given 
to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.” Id. 
 5. Id. at 569. 
 6. Id. at 576. 
 7. Id. at 576–77 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
758, 763 (1985)). 
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judgment as a matter of law.”8 Snyder filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari, arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling resulted in an 
overbroad application of First Amendment protection, and that 
funerals deserve special protection from tortious speech.9 
II. FACTS 
Lance Cpl. Snyder was killed in Iraq on March 3, 2006.10 Local 
newspapers published his obituary and notices that his funeral was 
scheduled for March 10, 2006.11 The WBC notified local police that its 
members would be present, issued a press release announcing plans to 
picket the funeral, and arrived, as planned, on the day of the funeral 
to picket the ceremony.12 While religious duty may have factored into 
the motive for the protest,13 the WBC’s likely purpose was to generate 
publicity.14 The WBC’s past activities—which have involved expressing 
opposition against Jews,15 Catholics,16 and other minority groups17—
suggested that retaliatory purposes may also have been at play.18 
At Lance Cpl. Snyder’s funeral, the Phelpses’ picketing included 
signs of a “general” nature19 and others that might be interpreted as 
specifically directed at Lance Cpl. Snyder’s family.20 Although each 
 
 8. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 9. Brief for Petitioner at 1820, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. May 24, 2010). 
 10. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 571–72. 
 13. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2008) (“As part of [the plaintiff’s] 
religious duties, she believes she must protest and picket at certain funerals, including the 
funerals of United States soldiers, to publish the church’s religious message . . . .”). 
 14. See Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571–72 (“Defendants’ rationale was quite simple. They 
traveled to Matthew Snyder’s funeral in order to publicize their message of God’s hatred of 
America for its tolerance of homosexuality.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Mary Murphy, Jewish Schools Brace for Hate, WPIX 11 (Oct. 7th, 2010, 6:28 
PM), http://www.wpix.com/news/wpix-jewish-school-brace-for-hate,0,1867514 (discussing the 
WBC’s acts directed at a Jewish school). 
 16. See, e.g., PRIESTS RAPE BOYS, http://www.priestsrapeboys.com (last visited Nov. 7th, 
2010) (denouncing Catholic pedophilia). 
 17. See, e.g., Chris Preovolos, Nerds Unite, Fight Religious Extremists at Comic Con, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (July 23, 2010, 9:28 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/ 
hottopics/detail?entry_id=68540 (documenting the WBC protest at comic book convention). 
 18. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 36 (“The evidence at trial, however, established 
that the Phelpses began protesting military funerals shortly after members of the WBC allegedly 
were accosted by Marines.”). 
 19. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578. “General” signs refer to those that the WBC addressed 
to the world at large, such as signs that read “America is Doomed,” and “God hates America.” 
 20. Id. Signs of a more “specific” nature those which directly addressed the Snyder family 
including Lance Cpl. These signs read “You are going to hell” and “God hates you.” 
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party disputed the distance between the protestors and the funeral,21 
it was “undisputed . . . that [d]efendants complied with local 
ordinances and police directions.” 22 Moreover, although Snyder could 
see the tops of the signs during the funeral procession, he did not see 
their content until watching a news program that covered the event.23 
Later, the WBC posted an “Epic”24 on its website: “The Burden of 
Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”25 The Epic stated that “Snyder 
had been ‘raised for the devil’ and ‘taught to defy God.’”26 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Generally, the First Amendment does not permit restrictions on 
speech based upon the content of the speech itself.27 Not all speech, 
however, is permitted.28 There are two different lines of case law that 
apply to the arguments made in Snyder v. Phelps. The first line of case 
law addresses whether the speech Phelpses engaged in is protected 
from tort liability due to its style or subjects. The second line 
addresses whether Snyder, as a funeral attendee, may have any 
recourse under the “captive audience doctrine.”29 
Whether tort liability attaches to speech depends on the type of 
speech or to whom the speech is directed, as analyzed under the 
standard set in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.30 In New York Times, 
the named newspaper was sued by the Montgomery Public Safety 
Commissioner for publishing inaccurate descriptions of some 
activities taken by the Montgomery police against civil rights 
 
 21. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 54 (asserting that the distance was 200300 feet 
during the funeral procession); Brief for Respondents at 7, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. 
July 7, 2010) (asserting that the distance was over 1,000 feet from the church). 
 22. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The “Epic” was a fictional account of Lance Cpl. Snyder’s upbringing and life authored 
by the WBC. See Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
 25. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 26. Id. at 570. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 45–55 (claiming that there was, 
in the “Epic,” at least one provably false statement which bore no relationship to issues that 
allegedly were the subject of the protest). 
 27. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 28. See id. at 103 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that “the First Amendment does not 
literally mean that we ‘are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government 
censorship.’”). 
 29. See infra notes 4448 and accompanying text. 
 30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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protestors.31 The Court held that to recover tort damages against the 
newspaper the Commission must show that the New York Times 
knowingly published a false story and did so with actual malice.32 The 
opinion is “authority for the proposition that the imposition of tort 
liability is state action subject to constitutional limitation in order to 
prevent the inhibition of free speech . . . although it has also been 
distinguished as applying only to debate on issues of public concern . . 
. .”33 
Over the next two decades, the Court extended and honed New 
York Times. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,34 the Court suggested that 
speech pertaining to public figures might be treated differently than 
speech pertaining to private figures.35 Gertz additionally set the 
standard for determining what makes an individual a public figure—
by either gaining “fame or notoriety” or, alternatively, by voluntarily 
injecting oneself or being drawn into a public controversy.36 Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell37 extended the New York Times standard to an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim made by a 
public figure.38 Finally, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.39 suggested 
that speech pertaining to private figures and public figures should be 
treated differently.40 Milkovich also stands for the proposition that 
“hyperbolic” public speech that cannot be interpreted as stating or 
implying actual facts should be protected.41 
 
 31. Id. at 256–59. 
 32. Id. at 279–80. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 761 (1985) (articulating the standard for determining whether speech is “public speech”). 
 33. Alan Stephens, Annotation, First Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech or Press 
as Defense to Liability Stemming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 
26 (1989). 
 34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 35. See id. at 342–45 (1974) (discussing the distinction between public and private figures as 
plaintiffs in speech-based tort claims, and concluding that “the state interest in compensating 
injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule [than the rule stated 
in New York Times] should obtain with respect to [private figures]”). 
 36. See id. at 351–52 (“Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the 
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be 
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public-figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s 
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”). 
 37. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 38. Id. at 56. 
 39. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. Id. at 21. Note the similarity between the “hyperbolic” language protected here and the 
“extreme and outrageous conduct” that is defined as an element of the tort of IIED (IIED is 
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as “extreme and outrageous conduct [that] 
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A subordinate issue in this discussion is how to determine whether 
speech is related to a matter of public concern. In Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,42 the Court held that such a determination 
depends on an evaluation of an expression’s “content, form, and 
context . . . as revealed by the whole record.”43 Importantly, in 
rejecting the argument that giving out certain credit information was 
public speech, the Dun & Bradstreet Court noted that the speech in 
question was “solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its 
specific business audience.”44 
A separate line of case law pertains to the captive audience 
doctrine. To find that the target of speech is part of a protected 
“captive audience,” a court must determine that a listener’s privacy 
interests warrant protection and that the speaker’s conduct interferes 
with the listener’s interest in an intolerable way.45 In Frisby v. Schultz,46 
the Supreme Court upheld a narrow municipal ordinance that 
prohibited picketing in front of a residence.47 The Court focused on 
the unavoidable nature of speech targeted at a home and the unique 
nature of the home itself.48 The Court’s narrow holding later was 
broadened in another, limited context—abortion protest cases.49 
IV. HOLDING 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court to hold 
that the WBC could not be held liable for an IIED claim because the 
First Amendment protected the speech at issue. The court focused on 
reassessing the implications of Phelpses’ conduct and on Jury 
 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”). RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 42. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 43. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)). 
 44. Id. at 762. 
 45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
 46. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
 47. Id. at 487–88 (1988) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting picketing near a specific 
residence). 
 48. Id. at 484 (“Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech 
they do not want to hear . . . the home is different.” (citations omitted)). 
 49. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (upholding a statute which prohibited 
knowingly approaching within eight feet of an individual within 100 feet of a health care 
facility); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 781 (1994) (finding that First 
Amendment protections did not “encompass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive 
audience” and that there was no “unqualified constitutional right to follow and harass an 
unwilling listener, especially one on her way to receive medical services.”). 
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Instruction No. 21.50 The Fourth Circuit analyzed three aspects of 
Phelpses’ expressive conduct (the general and specific signs used at 
the protest, and the online Epic), held that all three forms of 
expression constituted protected speech, and reversed the judgment 
of the district court accordingly.51 
The Fourth Circuit did not focus on Snyder’s private status (as the 
district court had), but instead was concerned with the type of speech 
in question.52 The court noted that “certain types of speech are 
protected regardless of plaintiff’s status as private or public figure.”53 
The court stated that there are two protected subcategories of speech: 
statements on matters of public concern that did not contain facts that 
could be proven false,54 and “rhetorical statements employing ‘loose, 
figurative, or hyperbolic language . . .’.”55 The Fourth Circuit 
questioned whether the Phelpses’ speech “could reasonably be 
interpreted as asserting ‘actual facts’ about an individual,” or 
consisted merely of “rhetorical hyperbole.”56 Although the Fourth 
Circuit conceded that signs reading “You’re Going to Hell” and “God 
Hates You” presented “a closer question” of whether the Phelpses 
were asserting actual facts about Lance Cpl. Snyder, the court held 
that none of the signs, nor the Epic, reasonably could be interpreted 
as “asserting actual and provable facts.”57 Instead, the signs and Epic 
could only be interpreted as “hyperbolic rhetoric,” and the thus the 
First Amendment protected Phelps’s speech as a matter of law.58 
 
 50. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 214–15, 221–22 (4th Cir. 2009). Jury Instruction No. 21 
addresses how the jury should balance “the Defendants’ expression of religious belief with 
another citizen’s right to privacy.’” Jury Instruction 21 was irrelevant because the Fourth Circuit 
held it protected as a matter of law. 
 51. Id. at 222–26 (“[W]e are constrained to conclude that the Defendants’ signs and Epic 
are constitutionally protected.”). 
 52. Id. at 222. 
 53. Id. at 218 (citing Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304–05 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 54. Id. at 219 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)). The court 
adds that whether speech involves a matter of public concern is a matter of law, to be 
ascertained by “examining the content, form, and context of such speech, as revealed by the 
whole record.” Snyder, 580 F.3d at 219. 
 55. Id. at 220 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21). 
 56. Id. at 222 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20). 
 57. Id. at 224. 
 58. Id. at 223–26. 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Snyder’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments 
Petitioner Snyder’s arguments focused on his status as a private 
individual and the captive audience doctrine.  First, he contends that 
private and public figures are subject to different First Amendment 
standards as plaintiffs in civil tort claims. Snyder argues that the 
Fourth Circuit erred by granting protection to the WBC on the 
grounds that the WBC’s speech could not “reasonably be interpreted 
as stating actual facts” that could be proven false.59 Snyder claims that 
he should not have to prove the falsity of the WBC’s speech as an 
element of his claim in addition to the standard elements of an IIED 
claim.60 The standard elements, Snyder asserts, are sufficient.61 
To support this argument, Snyder contends that no matter of 
public concern was involved in the dispute—just because the WBC 
says this is a matter of public concern does not make it one.62 Further, 
he argues that the Fourth Circuit misapplied Hustler to the facts of 
this case.63 Snyder asserts that the standard set out in New York Times 
and applied (to an IIED claim) in Hustler—that a public figure could 
not recover damages in a libel action without proving the falsity of the 
speech and “actual malice”—was justified because the speech was 
directed at public figures.64 Snyder notes that Gertz specifies that 
speech directed at private individuals is not “equally positioned” 
relative to speech directed at public individuals, and therefore private 
individuals deserve a greater degree of protection.65 
 
 59. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 21. 
 60. Id. at 41–43. Snyder argues that the falsity requirement should only apply when the 
claim is one of defamation, as in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), and claims that adding falsity to the 
elements of an IIED claim deprives a plaintiff protection from entire categories of expressive 
conduct and allows a speaker to ensure constitutional immunity from liability by relying on 
outrageous statements that do not contain a provably false factual connotation. Snyder contends 
that, in effect, the element of outrageousness in the IIED claim becomes an affirmative defense 
to the claim itself because outrageous conduct is an element of the tort of IIED. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 18–19, 34–40. 
 63. Id. at 28 (asserting that “[t]he Hustler Court grounded its opinion on the special status 
of those who intentionally enter the public arena” and contrasting Hustler and Gertz on the 
basis of whether to apply the New York Times standard to public and private figures, 
respectively). 
 64. Id. at 23–28. 
 65. Id. at 23. 
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Snyder also asserts that as a private individual who did not expose 
himself to a public matter he did not assume the risk of emotional 
harm by voluntarily “stepping into the public arena.”66 He claims that 
the Fourth Circuit misapplied Milkovich as “an absolute tort 
exemption for ‘rhetorical hyperbole’.”67 Instead, he contends that 
Milkovich stands for the proposition that speech rights must be 
balanced against society’s interest in preventing and redressing 
attacks upon reputation.68 Snyder points out that Milkovich did not 
apply to all “rhetorical hyperbole” regardless of the cause of action, 
but only to defamation claims.69 
Second, Snyder argues that funeral attendees constitute a “captive 
audience” in that they may be protected from unwanted speech 
without violating First Amendment principles.70 Specifically, he asserts 
that the captive audience doctrine justifies protection from emotional 
harm like that inflicted by the Phelpses.71 Snyder argues that funeral 
mourners have a sufficient privacy interest and that the WBC’s 
conduct interfered with Snyder’s privacy interest in an intolerable 
manner.72 Although whether the conduct amounted to interference 
ultimately is a question of fact, Snyder raises a legal question as to 
whether funeral mourners have a sufficient privacy interest to qualify 
as a captive audience. Frisby focuses on the special nature of the 
home as a refuge or retreat that can be protected by a special 
ordinance prohibiting picketing, while Snyder argues that such special 
protection depends on the features that define this setting, rather than 
the setting itself.73 Snyder contends that the value of a privacy interest 
may vary depending on the setting, and that a funeral setting is of the 
kind the Court has sought to protect.74 
 
 66. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (discussing the 
rationale for distinguishing public from private figures)). 
 67. Id. at 30. 
 68. Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990)). 
 69. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that the Fourth Circuit improperly 
interpreted Hustler and Milkovich as establishing that “‘rhetorical hyperbole’ is immune from 
any tort liability, regardless of the target of [the speech]” (emphasis added)). 
 70. Id. at 18–21. 
 71. Id. at 45. 
 72. Id. at 54. 
 73. Id. at 47. 
 74. Id. at 46, 48. Note that Snyder also points to Hill v. United States, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) 
and Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) as examples of recognized captive 
audiences in settings outside of the home. 
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B. The WBC’s (Respondents’) Arguments 
Respondent WBC asserts that this case is about hyperbolic public 
speech pertaining to issues of public concern and is thus deserving of 
First Amendment protections.75 The WBC asserts three broad 
arguments. First, that the WBC’s speech pertained to public issues and 
could not be proven false, and therefore should be considered 
protected speech under the First Amendment.76 Second, the WBC’s 
speech was also hyperbolic and could not be interpreted as stating 
actual facts (and pertains to public issues)—and for those reasons, is 
protected by the First Amendment.77 Third, Snyder was not a member 
of a captive audience, and even if he was, that the protest was too far 
away from Lance Cpl. Snyder’s funeral to invade the Snyder family’s 
privacy.78 
The WBC’s first argument—that the speech in question was not 
provably false and pertained to public issues—primarily is based on 
the application of Hustler’s requirements of falsity and actual malice 
to Snyder’s tort claims.79 The WBC encourages the protection of open 
debate in society on matters of public importance, particularly when 
the speech involved is unpopular or offensive.80 It stresses the need to 
protect public speech in particular.81 Under the standard articulated in 
Dun & Bradstreet, the WBC argues its speech was public and 
therefore deserves a high level of protection.82 The argument boils 
down to an assertion that the WBC’s speech is public speech and 
therefore Hustler should apply to this case.83 If Hustler applies, then 
the WBC’s speech must be provably false and, if it is not, then 
Snyder’s claim must fail.84 
 
 75. Brief for Respondents, supra note 21, at 1 (“This case is about a little church in Topeka, 
Kansas . . . engaging in public speech on a public right-of-way, about issues of vital public 
interest and importance, over a thousand feet from a public funeral paid for by public funds 
with public law enforcement overseeing the event, with a large presence of public media who 
published details about the funeral and deceased soldier before and after the funeral.”). 
 76. Id. at 20. 
 77. Id. at 33. 
 78. Id. at 37. 
 79. See id. at 20 (arguing that Snyder wants “an exemption from the requirement[s] of 
Hustler”). 
 80. Id. at 21. 
 81. Id. at 21–25 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 269–73 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967); Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)). 
 82. Brief for Respondents, supra note 21, at 26, 29–30. 
 83. Id. at 20, 30. 
 84. Id. (arguing that the Court should reject Snyder’s arguments and not permit liability to 
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The WBC’s bases its second argument on the Court’s holding in 
Milkovich: the First Amendment protects “words that are no more 
than rhetorical hyperbole, or vigorous epithet; and words which could 
not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts, used in a 
loose, figurative sense.”85 The WBC argues that “[t]he signs and [E]pic 
contain language that plainly shows it is religious commentary, 
purposefully hyperbolic,” concerning public issues, and, therefore, the 
WBC’s speech should be protected.86 If the Court were to decline to 
protect hyperbolic public speech from tort liability, the WBC argues 
that such a rule would “rip the First Amendment to useless shreds.”87 
Such a standard would be overly subjective and likely render some 
public or religious speech tortious, potentially chilling the exercise of 
public speech.88 
Third, the WBC disputes Snyder’s contention that funeral 
attendees may be considered members of a captive audience.89 Even if 
they can be part of a captive audience, the WBC argues that its speech 
“occurred well outside of any zone of privacy the [C]ourt might ever 
recognize in a public funeral.”90 It emphasizes that close physical 
proximity is necessary to find that an audience is captive.91 In 
disputing Snyder’s claim that funeral attendees have a sufficient 
privacy interest at stake to warrant captive audience status, the WBC 
points to multiple cases where courts have failed to recognize such a 
broad privacy interest at funerals.92 Although the WBC concedes a 
“body disposition right,” it maintains that “by no process of logic” 
does such a right “lead to a per se privacy interest in a funeral, no 
matter how public.”93 
 
attach for “not-proven-false words”). 
 85. Brief for Respondents, supra note 21, at 35 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
U.S. 1, 17 (1990)). 
 86. Id. at 36. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 37, 58 (asserting that “[p]etitioner is not entitled to assert a privacy claim, because 
there was no intrusion”). 
 90. Id. at 37. 
 91. Id. at 43. 
 92. Id. at 44, 49–50. 
 93. Id. at 51. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Although the Fourth Circuit’s decision might be lauded for its 
simplicity, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will take such a 
straightforward approach to the case. While the Fourth Circuit was 
correct in holding that the jury was improperly instructed to decide a 
matter of law, the court’s protection of the right to free speech in the 
context of this case seems overbroad. The Fourth Circuit erred by 
applying the standards from defamation cases involving public-figure 
plaintiffs with IIED claims to private-figure plaintiffs with similar 
claims. As noted by Snyder, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling may “[turn] 
outrageousness from the threshold element of the tort into an 
affirmative defense.”94 Essentially, the Fourth Circuit’s rationale 
would protect speech such as that made by the WBC, simply because 
the speech fell within the definition of the tort.95 By protecting 
Phelps’s conduct in this way, the Fourth Circuit did not protect public 
speech; instead, it may simply have interfered with the ability of the 
states to protect their citizens from harm.96 The specific facts of this 
case, however, are not helpful to Snyder under the current First 
Amendment jurisprudence. While it is possible that the Supreme 
Court will use Snyder to expand upon these doctrines, it is more likely 
that the Court will affirm the Fourth Circuit’s opinion. However, the 
Court may decide simply to articulate more detailed guidelines for 
evaluating similar future cases. 
Both parties’ arguments confirm that this case provides an 
opportunity for the Court to articulate some guidelines about where 
First Amendment protections end and viable tort claims begin. 
Although Snyder’s arguments pertaining to the public–private 
distinction make sense when considering the Court’s prior decisions 
(e.g., Gertz, Milkovich, and even Frisby), these rulings will probably 
not persuade the Court to create standards that limit the free 
exchange of ideas on public issues—even if such an exchange is as 
otherwise deplorable as that exercised by the WBC. On the one hand, 
 
 94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 20. See notes 41 and 60 and accompanying text. 
 95. See notes 41 and 60 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Brief for the State of Kansas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23–
24, Snyder v. Phelps, (No. 09-751) (U.S. July 14, 2010) (asserting that applying First 
Amendment protections to the WBC’s conduct will do nothing to promote “public debate on 
public matters” and instead will only interfere with “states’ traditional latitude to define and 
enforce tort remedies for intentional interference with privacy interests.”). 
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relevant case law states that distinguishing between public and private 
figures is important, and here it would seem that Snyder is not a 
public figure. On the other hand, for the Court to rule in favor of 
Snyder, it would have to find that distasteful or outrageous speech on 
public issues could be the basis for liability if aimed at a private party 
with the intent of inflicting emotional distress. The Court is unlikely to 
do so. This is because of the subjective nature of the element of 
outrageousness within an IIED tort97 and because causing some 
distress to an audience is exactly what makes some speech effective.98 
As the Court has previously noted, “the fact that society may find 
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”99 The 
Court will likely follow this general line of reasoning. 
As for Snyder’s contention that an expansion of the captive 
audience doctrine would be appropriate here, the Court seems 
unlikely to agree.100 First, the captive audience doctrine is extremely 
narrow in its application, thus far limited to those within their own 
residence and to those accessing abortion services.101 Although those 
attending a funeral may be similarly captive to those in their home or 
those entering an abortion clinic, the particular funeral attendees in 
this case were not similarly captive. As some have noted, the Court 
generally will only recognize a captive audience in circumstances with 
a “physical or aural intrusion, or an intrusion into the home, that the 
individual cannot avoid.”102 Here, the funeral was held inside of a 
building, Snyder did not actually read the signs during the funeral, no 
 
 97. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (“‘Outrageousness’ in the area 
of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury 
to impose liability on the basis of . . . perhaps [the jurors’] dislike of a particular expression.  
[Such a] standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded 
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”). Note, 
during oral arguments Justice Kagan pointed to this specific passage of Hustler. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 22, Snyder, No. 09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010). 
 98. See Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice at 16–17, Snyder v. 
Phelps No. 09-751 (U.S. July 14, 2010) (“Free speech is often designed precisely to distress the 
audience. . . . In short, there is a crucial place under the First Amendment for speech that 
‘inflicts emotional distress.’ . . . It is thus constitutionally insufficient to assert that speech is 
designed to distress the listener.”). Note also that this amicus brief offers perhaps a more 
workable standard to the Court: maliciousness. 
 99. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
 100. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Snyder, No. 09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010) 
(discussing captive audience doctrine with attorney for respondents). 
 101. See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 781 (1994). 
 102. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of First Amendment Law in Support of Respondent 
Phelps at 8, Snyder v. Phelps No. 09-751 (U.S. July 14, 2010). 
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noted physical or aural intrusion occurred, and the WBC complied 
with all applicable ordinances and police instructions.103 The only 
possible physical intrusion was a diversion of the funeral procession.104 
Under these facts, a finding that Snyder was a member of a captive 
audience would mark a broad expansion of the doctrine.105 For similar 
reasons, it is likely that Snyder’s intrusion upon seclusion claim will 
fail as well. Although the WBC’s arguments on public speech ignore 
distinctions between libel and IIED and between public and private 
figures, they more clearly line up with a policy of giving public speech 
“breathing room,” and therefore will likely be convincing to the 
Court. This does not mean that a funeral audience could not be a 
captive audience in other circumstances, as there are conceivable facts 
that provide a much closer question. Whether the Court will take this 
opportunity to articulate such a standard is debatable, but observers 
should expect, at least, a broad reaffirmation of free speech rights. 
 
 103. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008). 
 104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 4. 
 105. See Brief of Scholars of First Amendment Law, supra note 102, at 9 (“Nothing in the 
facts of this case suggests that an intrusion of the type recognized by the Court ever occurred at 
the funeral ceremony. Rather, in the absence of any physical or aural intrusion on the 
ceremony, Snyder complains of a purely psychological intrusion from the emotional impact of a 
message that offended him.”). 
